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LIMITED WAIVER OF THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT
PRIVILEGE UPON VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE
TO THE SEC
INTRODUCTION
Although the attorney-client privilege' is recognized in all jurisdic-
1. Professor Wigmore summarized the general principle of the attorney-client
privilege as follows: "(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a
professional legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to
that purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance
permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal adviser, (8) ex-
cept the protection be waived." 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law §
2292, at 554 (J. McNaughton rev. ed. 1961) (emphasis omitted). This statement of
the privilege is widely accepted by the courts. E.g.. United States v. Landof, 591
F.2d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1978) (quoting 8 J. Wigmore, supra. § 2292, at 554): United
States v. Stern, 511 F.2d 1364, 1367-68 (2d Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 829
(1975); NLRB v. Harvey, 349 F.2d 900, 904 (4th Cir. 1965) (same). A concise and
often-quoted formulation of the criteria for application of the privilege was set forth
by Judge Wyzanski in United States v. United Shoe Macl. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357
(D. Mass. 1950): "The privilege applies only if (1) the asserted holder of the privilege
is or sought to become a client; (2) the person to whom the communication was
made (a) is a member of the bar of a court, or his subordinate and (b) in connection
with this communication is acting as a lawyer; (3) the communication relates to a
fact of which the attorney was informed (a) by his client (b) without the presence of
strangers (c) for the purpose of securing primarily either (i) an opinion on law or
(ii) legal services or (iii) assistance in some legal proceeding, and not (d) for the
purpose of committing a crime or tort: and (4) the privilege has been (a) claimed
and (b) not waived by the client." Id. at 358-59. The privilege is that of the client,
not the attorney. Schwimmer v. United States, 232 F.2d 855, 863 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 352 U.S. 833 (1956); C. McCormick, McCormick's Handbook of the Law of
Evidence § 92, at 192 (E. Cleary 2d ed. 1972). The burden of proving that the
privilege applies to a particular communication is placed upon the party asserting it.
United States v. Stern, 511 F.2d 1364, 1367 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 829
(1975); United States v. Gurtner, 474 F.2d 297, 298 (9th Cir. 1973): International
Paper Co. v. Fibreboard Corp., 63 F.R.D. 88, 93 (D. Del. 1974). For the privilege to
attach, the communication must have been made and maintained in confidence
under circumstances where it is reasonable to assume that disclosure to third persons
was not intended. United States v. Bump, 605 F.2d 548, 551 (10th Cir. 1979); United
States v. Pipkins, 528 F.2d 559, 563 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 952 (1976); In
re Horowitz, 482 F.2d 72, 81-82 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 867 (1973); 8 J.
Wigmore, supra, § 2311, at 599-603; see In re Victor, 422 F. Supp. 475, 476
(S.D.N.Y. 1976). The privilege does not apply to everything arising out of the
attorney-client relationship. United States v. Pipkins, 528 F.2d 559, 563 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 426 U.S. 952 (1976); United States v. Goldfarb, 328 F.2d 280, 282 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 976 (1964). "The attorney-client privilege... need not
foreclose inquiry into the general nature of a lawyer's activities on behalf of a client,
the conditions of the lawyer's employment, or any. of the other external trappings of
the relationship; the privilege is concerned only with confidential communications,
not with the structural framework within which they are uttered." Cohen v. Uni-
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tions,2 it has often been criticized by courts :' and commentators, 4 and
arguments have been advanced to limit its scope.5 The criticism
focuses on the privilege's inhibitory effect on the truth-finding process
royal, Inc., 80 F.R.D. 480, 483 (E.D. Pa. 1978); accord United States v. Jones, 517
F.2d 666, 669-72 (5th Cir. 1975); cf. J.P. Foley & Co. v. Vanderbilt, 65 F.R.D. 523,
526-27 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (no privilege attaches when attorney is acting as business
agent for client). The privilege only protects the communications, not the underlying
information contained therein. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 395-96
(1981). The privilege applies to corporate as well as to individual clients. Id. at 389-
90; Diversified Indus. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 608 (8th Cir. 1978) (en bane);
Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 320 F.2d 314, 323 (7th Cir. 1963). For
a general discussion of the privilege as applied to corporations, see 2 D. Louisell & C.
Mueller, Federal Evidence § 212 (1978); Simon, The Attorney-Client Privilege as
Applied to Corporations, 65 Yale L.J. 953 (1956).
2. 3 S. Gard, Jones on Evidence § 21:8, at 762 & n.61 (6th ed. 1972); see
Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981). The attorney-client privilege
is the oldest of the privileges for protecting confidential communications. Id.; 8 J.
Wigmore, supra note 1, § 2290, at 542; see C. McCormick, supra note 1, § 87, at
175. In 1888, the Supreme Court explained that the privilege is "founded upon the
necessity, in the interest and administration of justice, of the aid of persons having
knowledge of the law and skilled in its practice, which assistance can only be safely
and readily availed of when free from the consequences or the apprehension of
disclosure." Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888). The premise underlying
the privilege is that sound legal advice is in the public interest and such advice
depends upon the attorney being fully informed by the client. Upjohn Co. v. United
States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981); Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980).
By protecting their communications from discovery, the privilege serves to encourage
full and frank communication between attorney and client. Upjohn Co. v. United
States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981); Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976).
"If such communications were required to be made the subject of examination and
publication, such enactment would be a practical prohibition upon professional
advice and assistance." United States v. Louisville & N.R.R., 236 U.S. 318, 336
(1915). The benefits of frank communication to the administration of justice are seen
as outweighing the "detriment to justice from a power to shut off inquiry to pertinent
facts in court." C. McCormick, supra note 1, § 87, at 175; accord United States v.
United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358 (D. Mass. 1950). The privilege has
also been justified by the "unfairness in an adversary system of forcing one party at
the behest of his adversary to expose to the latter any secret revelations which the
party has made to his own attorney." 2 D. Louisell & C. Mueller, supra note 1, §
207, at 507 (footnote omitted).
3. Permian Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214, 1221 (D.C. Cir. 1981); e.g.,
In re Horowitz, 482 F.2d 72, 81 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 867 (1973); Garner
v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093, 1100 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974
(1971).
4. C. McCormick, supra note 1, § 87, at 176-77; 2 J. Weinstein & M. Berger,
Weinstein's Evidence 503[02], at 503-16 (1981); 8 J. Wigmore, supra note 1, §
2291, at 549-54; Gardner, A Re-evaluation of the Attorney-Client Privilege (pt. 1), 8
Vill. L. Rev. 279, 30,4-07 (1963).
5. See 8 J. Wigmore, supra note 1, § 2291, at 554. Regarding the privilege,
Wigmore states: "Its benefits are all indirect and speculative; its obstruction is plain
and concrete. . . . It is worth preserving for the sake of a general policy, but it is
nonetheless an obstacle to the investigation of the truth. It ought to be strictly
confined within the narrowest possible limits consistent with the logic of its prinei-
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and its impairment of the public's "right to every man's evidence."
In response, modern liberal7 discovery rules 8 have taken a narrow
view of the privilege. 9 This tendency toward limiting the privilege is
most clearly manifested in the strict standard of waiver,"' which
provides that any loss of confidentiality through disclosure, even if
inadvertent, destroys the privilege." Courts have, however, relaxed
this standard in certain limited circumstances, to implement policies
in addition to those underlying the privilege itself.
Several recent cases have considered whether the waiver standard
can be relaxed in a particular corporate context-cooperation with
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in a nonpublic inves-
tigation.12 When the SEC conducts an informal, or nonpublic, inves-
pie." Id. (footnote omitted); see Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976);
Magida ex rel. Vulcan Detinning Co. v. Continental Can Co., 12 F.R.D. 74, 76-77
(S.D.N.Y. 1951); C. McCormick, supra note 1, § 87, at 176-77.
6. 8 J. Wigmore, supra note 1, § 2192, at 70: accord In re Horowitz, 482 F.2d
72, 81 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 867 (1973): Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430
F.2d 1093, 1100 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied. 401 U.S. 974 (1971); Cohen v.
Uniroyal, Inc., 80 F.R.D. 480, 483 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
7. United States v. Procter & Gamble Co.. 356 U.S. 677, 682 (1958): Hickman
v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947); Pierson v. United States, 428 F. Supp. 3S4, 390
(D. Del. 1977); Laufman v. Oakley Bldg. & Loan Co., 72 F.R.D. 116, 120 (S.D.
Ohio 1976); Ash v. Farwell, 37 F.R.D. 553, 555-56 (D. Kan. 1965); 8 C. Wright &
A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2206. at 607 (1970).
8. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26-37.
9. Magida ex rel. Vulcan Detinning Co. v. Continental Can Co., 12 F.R.D. 74,
77 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
10. E.g., Permian Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214, 1219, 1222 (D.C. Cir.
1981); United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 642 F.2d 1285, 1299 (D.C. Cir.
1980). In contrast to the strict standard of waiver in the attorney-client privilege
context, a more liberal standard is applied to the wvork-product privilege. Permian
Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214, 1219 (D.C. Cir. 1981). "[Wihile the mere
showing of a voluntary disclosure to a third person will generally suffice to show
waiver of the attorney-client privilege, it should not suffice in itself for waiver of the
work product privilege." United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 642 F.2d 1285,
1299 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (emphasis omitted). While the attorney-client privilege exists
to protect confidential communications, the work-product privilege exists to promote
the adversary system by protecting an attorney's work product from discovery by his
opponent. Thus, although a disclosure to a third part)' destroys the confidentiality of
the attorney-client privilege, it is not inconsistent with maintaining secrecy as against
the opposing party. Id.; see Transmirra Prods. Corp. v. Monsanto Chem. Co., 26
F.R.D. 572, 577-78 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (the two privileges are distinct and waiver of
one is not waiver of the other).
11. See infra notes 29-46 and accompanying text.
12. Permian Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214, 1219-22 (D.C. Cir. 1981);
Diversified Indus. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 611 (8th Cir. 1978) (en bane); Teach-
ers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n of Am. v. Shamrock Broadcasting Co., 521 F. Supp. 638,
639 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); In re LTV See. Litig., 89 F.R.D. 595, 618-19 (N.D. Tex.
1981); Byrnes v. IDS Realty Trust, 85 F.R.D. 679, 687 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); cf. In re
Weiss, 596 F.2d 1185, 1186 (4th Cir. 1979) (per curiam) (order sought to compel
testimony before grand jury); In re Penn Cent. Commercial Paper Litig., 61 F.R.D.
19821
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tigation, it seeks the cooperation of the corporation involved, even to
the extent of requesting that the corporation produce reports or other
documents prepared by its attorneys.' 3  In such a case, there is no
guarantee that confidentiality will be protected should unrelated par-
ties subsequently request the information, "' even if the SEC has
agreed not to disclose it pending a claim of privilege.15
The issue therefore arises whether such disclosure effects a general
waiver of the attorney-client privilege. The Eighth Circuit, in Diversi-
fied Industries v. Meredith,'0 and the Southern District of New York,
in Byrnes v. IDS Realty Trust,'7 have found a "limited waiver,"
holding that the privilege is lost only as to the SEC.' 8 They have
suggested that because corporations should be encouraged to cooper-
ate with government regulatory agencies, and because application of
the strict standard of waiver might discourage such cooperation, gen-
eral waiver rules should not apply.' 9 The District of Columbia Cir-
cuit, however, in Permian Corp. v. United Slates,20 rejected the con-
453, 463-64 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (order sought to compel deposition and document
production). Although the issue has thus far arisen only in the SEC context, several
courts supporting the limited waiver theory have framed the policy consideration in
terms of encouraging cooperation with government agencies generally. Diversified
Indus. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 604 n.1 (8th Cir. 1977); Teachers Ins. & Annuity
Ass'n of Am. v. Shamrock Broadcasting Co., 521 F. Supp. 638, 641 (S.D.N.Y. 1981);
Byrnes v. IDS Realty Trust, 85 F.R.D. 679, 688 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); see Block &
Barton, Internal Corporate Investigations: Maintaining the Confidentiality of a
Corporate Client's Communications with Investigative Counsel, 35 Bus. Law. 5, 32
(1979); cf. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated July 13, 1979, 478 F. Supp. 368, 372-73
(E.D. Wis. 1979) (decision based on policy of encouraging cooperation with the SEC,
IRS and grand jury, to which disclosures had been made).
13. E.g., Permian Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214, 1216 (D.C. Cir. 1981);
Byrnes v. IDS Realty Trust, 85 F.R.D. 679, 682 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
14. See infra notes 143-51, 171-73 and accompanying text.
15. Permian Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214, 1219 (D.C. Cir, 1981).
16. 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1978) (en bane).
17. 85 F.R.D. 679 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
18. Diversified Indus. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 611 (8th Cir. 1978) (en bane);
Byrnes v. IDS Realty Trust, 85 F.R.D. 679, 689 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); cf. In re LTV See.
Litig., 89 F.R.D. 595, 615 n.13, 620-21 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (disclosure to SEC by
Special Officer appointed pursuant to consent decree to investigate corporation
waives privilege only as to the SEC); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated July 13,
1979, 478 F. Supp. 368, 372-73 (E.D. Wis. 1979) (limited release of report to SEC
does not waive the privilege as to underlying notes sought by unrelated third party).
19. Diversified Indus. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 611 (8th Cir. 1978) (en bane);
Byrnes v. IDS Realty Trust, 85 F.R.D. 679, 688 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); accord Teachers
Ins, & Annuity Ass'n of Am. v. Shamrock Broadcasting Co., 521 F. Supp. 638, 641
(S.D.N.Y. 1981); In re LTV See. Litig., 89 F.R.D. 595, 619 (N.D. Tex. 1981); In re
Grand Jury Subpoena Dated July 13, 1979, 478 F. Supp. 368, 372-73 (E.D. Wis.
1979).
20. 665 F.2d 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
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cept of limited waiver, adhering to the traditional view that disclosure
to any third party waives the privilege entirely. 2'
This Note argues that although application of the strict standard of
waiver is appropriate in most instances, it should not be inflexibly
applied. Part I describes the strict standard of waiver, examines vari-
ous situations in which the courts have relaxed it for policy reasons,
and develops an analysis upon which the relaxation is implicitly
based. Employing the analysis developed in Part I, Part II concludes
that a limited waiver is appropriate in SEC disclosure cases when the
disclosing party has made a reservation of the privilege.
I. WAIVER OF ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
The attorney-client privilege is a defensive mechanism that protects
the client from forced disclosure of confidential communications with
his attorney.22 Two basic assumptions underlie the privilege: First,
the privilege encourages free and open communication between attor-
ney and client;2 3 and second, the benefit of keeping the communica-
tion confidential outweighs the potential harm to the truth-finding
process.24 However, because the benefits of the privilege are "indi-
rect and speculative," and "its obstruction is plain and concrete," ' -
the privilege has traditionally been read as narrowly as possible.2
Thus, waiver will result whenever confidentiality is lost27 and the
rationale for granting the privilege no longer exists.28
21. See infra pt. I(A). Permian, 665 F.2d at 1219-22, is in accord with earlier
cases that have found the privilege entirely waived by disclosure to the SEC. In re
Weiss, 596 F.2d 1185, 1186 (4th Cir. 1979) (per curiam); In re Penn Cent. Commer-
cial Paper Litig., 61 F.R.D. 453, 463-64 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). See generally 2 D. Louisell
& C. Mueller, supra note 1, § 209 (discussing the essentials of confidentiality).
22. United States v. Shibley, 112 F. Supp. 734, 741 (S.D. Cal. 1953); see supra
note 2.
23. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981); Fisher v. United
States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976); C. McCormick, supra note 1, § 87, at 175; 8 J.
Wigmore, supra note 1, § 2291, at 545; see supra note 2.
24. C. McCormick, supra note 1, § 87, at 175; 2 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, supra
note 4, 503[02], at 503-15; Kobak, The Uneven Application of the Attorney-Client
Privilege to Corporations in the Federal Courts. 6 Ga. L. Rev. 339, 339 (1972).
25. 8 J. Wigmore, supra note 1, § 2291, at 554.
26. See id.; 2J. Weinstein & M. Berger, supra note 4, 503[02], at 503-15 to -16.
27. Jarvis, Inc. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 84 F.R.D. 286, 292 (D. Colo.
1979); Dunn Chem. Co. v. Sybron Corp., 1975-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 60,561, at
67,461 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); In re Penn Cent. Commercial Paper Litig., 61 F.R.D. 453,
464 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Magida ex rel. Vulcan Detinning Co. v. Continental Can Co.,
12 F.R.D. 74, 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1951); 8 J. Wigmore, supra note 1, § 2311, at 599. o
28. In re Penn Cent. Commercial Paper Litig., 61 F.R.D. 453, 464 (S.D.N.Y.
1973); United States v. Kelsey-Hayes Wheel Co., 15 F.R.D. 461, 464 (E.D. Mich.
1954); 8 J. Wigmore, supra note 1, § 2311, at 599.
1982]
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A. The Traditional Standard
Waiver need not be express, 2 nor is it necessary that the client
waive the privilege knowingly. 30 Waiver may be evidenced by word
or act, 3' but may also be inferred from a failure to speak or act when
words or action would be necessary to preserve confidentiality. 3
Courts regularly hold that the privilege is waived as to the material
disclosed when the client or his attorney deliberately discloses the
contents of a privileged communication, 33 such as in answering inter-
rogatories, 34 testifying in court or at an examination before trial,3 5
29. Blackburn v. Crawfords, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 175, 194 (1865) (waiver may be
express or implied); Tasby v. United States, 504 F.2l 332, 336 (8th Cir. 1974) (same),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1125 (1975).
30. In re Grand Jury Investigation of Ocean Transp., 604 F.2d 672, 675 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 915 (1979); Daniels v. Hadley Memorial Hosp., 68
F.R.D. 583, 587 (D. D.C. 1975); 2 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, supra note 4, 511[02],
at 511-6 to -7. Contra Dunn Chem. Co. v. Sybron Corp., 1975-2 Trade Cas. (CCH)
60,561, at 67,463 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Schenectady Chems., Inc. v. General Elec.
Co., 184 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 208, 209 (N.D.N.Y. 1974); International Bus. Machs.
Corp. v. Sperry Rand Corp., 44 F.R.D. 10, 13 (D. Del. 1968); Connecticut Mut.
Life Ins. Co. v. Shields, 18 F.R.D. 448, 451 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
31. Magida ex rel. Vulcan Detinning Co. v. Continental Can Co., 12 F.R.D. 74,
77 (S.D.N.Y. 1951); 16 Minn. L. Rev. 818, 823 (1932); see, e.g., Daniels v. Hadley
Memorial Hosp., 68 F.R.D. 583, 587 (D.D.C. 1975); Underwater Storage, Inc. v.
United States Rubber Co., 314 F. Supp. 546, 549 (D.D.C. 1970); Malco Mfg. Co. v.
Elco Corp., 307 F. Supp. 1177, 1179 (E.D. Pa. 1969). Because the privilege belongs
to the client and not the attorney, Schwimmer v. United States, 232 F.2d 855, 863
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 833 (1956); 8 J. Wiginore, supra note 1, § 2321, it is
the client alone who holds the power to waive it. Id. The client's attorney or agent,
however, acting on behalf of the client, may exercise this power. Perrignon v. Bergen
Brunswig Corp., 77 F.R.D. 455, 460 (N.D. Cal. 1978); C. McCormick, supra note 1,
§ 93, at 194.
32. Magida ex rel. Vulcan Detinning Co. v. Continental Can Co., 12 F.R.D. 74,
77 (S.D.N.Y. 1951); In re Associated Gas & Elec. Co., 59 F. Supp. 743, 744
(S.D.N.Y. 1944); see, e.g., In re Horowitz, 482 F.2d 72, 82 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 867 (1973): United States v. Gurtner, 474 F.2d 297, 299 (9th Cir. 1973);
Litton Sys. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 31 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1212, 1218
(S.D.N.Y. 1981); In re Grand Jury Proceedings Involving Berkley & Co., 466 F.
Supp. 863, 870 (D. Minn. 1979), afJd, 629 F.2d 548 (8th Cir. 1980); Ranney-Brown
Distribs. v. E.T. Barwick Indus., 75 F.R.D. 3, 5-6 (S.D. Ohio 1977).
33. C. McCormick, supra note 1, § 93; 8 J. Wigmore, supra note 1, § 2327; e.g.,
In re Penn Cent. Commercial Paper Litig., 61 F.R.D. 453, 464 (S.D.N.Y. 1973);
D'Ippolito v. Cities Serv. Co., 39 F.R.D. 610, 610 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); In re Associated
Gas & Elec. Co., 59 F. Supp. 743, 744-45 (S.D.N.Y. 1944).
34. Malco Mfg. Co. v. Elco Corp., 307 F. Supp. 1177 (E.D. Pa. 1969). "To the
extent that a party answers an interrogatory relating to the contents of a privileged
communication ... the right to assert such privilege is waived." Id. at 1179 (citation
omitted).
35. E.g., Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470-71 (1888) (testimony at trial).
Daniels v. Hadley Memorial Hosp., 68 F.R.D. 583, 587 (D.D.C. 1975) (examination
before trial); Wild v. Payson, 7 F.R.D. 495, 500 (S.D.N.Y. 1946) (same); In re
Associated Gas & Elec. Co., 59 F. Supp. 743, 744 (S.D.N.Y. 1944) (testimony at
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submitting affidavits or pleadings to the court, 36 or in transacting
business with a third party.37  If the client wishes to preserve the
privileged status of the communication, it is incumbent upon him or
his attorney 38 to assert the privilege affirmatively by refusing to dis-
close the privileged matter;3 9 failure to do so is viewed as indicating
that the client intended to compromise confidentiality and thereby
waive the privilege's protection. 40
Waiver can also result from an inadvertent disclosure t-that is,
when the client fails to act affirmatively to safeguard the confidential-
ity of the privileged material. 42 Careless handling of privileged docu-
trial); cf. In re Grand Jur, Subpoena, 438 F. Supp. 1176, 1178 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)
(testimony given before grand jury).
36. E.g., Barr Marine Prods. Co. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 84 F.R.D. 631, 635
(E.D. Pa. 1979) (pleadings): In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 438 F. Supp. 1176, 1178
(S.D.N.Y. 1977) (affidavit); Garfinkle v. Arcata Nat'l Corp.. 64 F.R.D. 688, 689
(S.D.N.Y. 1974) (pleadings); International Paper Co. v. Fibreboard Corp., 63
F.R.D. 88, 92 (D. Del. 1974) (affidavit); Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am.
Brass Co., 275 F. Supp. 146, 148 (E.D. Pa. 1967) (pre-sentence memoranda): Smith
v. Bentley, 9 F.R.D. 489, 490 (S.D.N.Y. 1949) (pleadings).
37. E.g., Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. United States Dep't of the Air Force, 566
F.2d 242, 253 (D.C. Cir. 1977); SEC v. Texas Int'l Airlines, 29 Fed. R. Serv. 2d
(Callaghan) 408, 409 (D.D.C. 1979); SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 70 F.R.D. 508,
519 (D. Conn.), appeal dismissed, 534 F.2d 1031 (2d Cir. 1976): Eastman Kodak Co.
v. International Harvester Co., 14 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1272, 1273
(S.D.N.Y. 1970); Underwater Storage, Inc. v. United States Rubber Co., 314 F.
Supp. 546, 549 (D.D.C. 1970).
38. Republic Gear Co. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 381 F.2d 551, 556 (2d Cir. 1967).
"Not only may an attorney invoke the privilege ... but he should do so, for he is
'duty-bound to raise the claim in any proceeding in order to protect communications
made in confidence.' " Id. (citations omitted) (quoting A.B. Dick Co. v. Marr, 95 F.
Supp. 83, 101 (S.D.N.Y. 1950), appeal dismissed, 197 F.2d 498 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 344 U.S. 878 (1952)); accord Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 402 n.8
(1976); Tillotson v. Boughner, 350 F.2d 663, 665 (7th Cir. 1965); Schwimmer v.
United States, 232 F.2d 855, 863 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 833 (1956).
39. United States v. Gurtner, 474 F.2d 297, 299 (9th Cir. 1973); Donovan v.
Fitzsimmons, 31 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1537, 1538 (N.D. 111. 1981): Litton
Sys. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 31 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1212, 1218
(S.D.N.Y. 1981).
40. E.g., Donovan v. Fitzsimmons, 31 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1537, 1538
(N.D. Ill. 1981); Daniels v. Hadley Memorial Hosp., 68 F.R.D. 583, 587 (D.D.C.
1975); United States v. Krasnov, 143 F. Supp. 184, 190-91 (E.D. Pa. 1956), aff'd per
curiam, 355 U.S. 5 (1957).
41. In re Grand Jury Investigation of Ocean Transp., 604 F.2d 672, 674-75
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 915 (1979); Suburban Sew 'N Sweep, Inc. v.
Swiss-Bernina, Inc., 32 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 653, 656-57 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 24,
1981); Daniels v. Hadley Memorial Hosp., 68 F.R.D. 583, 587 (D.D.C. 1975).
42. In re Horowitz, 482 F.2d 72, 82 (2d Cir.), cert. denied. 414 U.S. 867 (1973);
Ranney-Brown Distribs. v. E.T. Barwick Indus., 75 F.R.D. 3, 5-6 (S.D. Ohio 1977);
United States v. Kelsey-Hayes Wheel Co., 15 F.R.D. 461, 465 (E.D. Mich. 1954)- see
In re Grand Jury Proceedings Involving Berkley & Co., 466 F. Supp. 863, 870 (D.
Minn. 1979) (discussing the steps a corporation must take to preserve the confiden-
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ments that leads to a loss of confidentiality destroys the privilege as to
the material disclosed. 43 The strict waiver standard has even been
applied when a third person has overheard the privileged communica-
tion without the client's knowledge 4 or has surreptitiously obtained
the privileged material. 45 The standard thus holds that any loss of
confidentiality abrogates the privilege as to that communication or
material. 46
Furthermore, less than full disclosure will often cause a waiver, not
only as to the disclosed communications, 47 but also as to communica-
tions relating to the same subject matter that were not themselves
disclosed. 48  By partial disclosure, the client may be voluntarily waiv-
ing the privilege as to material he considers favorable to his position,
but attempting to invoke the privilege as to the remaining material,
which he considers unfavorable. 49  Selective assertion or disclosure
usually involves a material issue in the proceeding,50 and there is a
tiality of its records), af''d, 629 F.2d 548 (8th Cir. 1980); Proposed Fed. R. Evid.
503(a)(4) advisory committee's note, 56 F.R.D. 183, 238 (1972) ("Taking or failing to
take precautions may be considered as bearing on intent" to preserve confidential-
ity.).
43. E.g., In re Horowitz, 482 F.2d 72, 82 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 867
(1973); Jarvis, Inc. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 84 F.R.D. 286, 292 (D. Colo.
1979); In re Victor, 422 F. Supp. 475, 476 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
44. United States v. Olmstead, 7 F.2d 760, 763 (W.D. Wash. 1925) (wiretap-
ping); 8 J. Wigmore, supra note 1, § 2326.
45. Suburban Sew 'N Sweep, Inc. v. Swiss-Bernina, Inc., 32 Fed. R. Serv. 2d
(Callaghan) 653, 659 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 24, 1981); 8 J. Wigmore, supra note 1, §§ 2325,
2326; see C. McCormick, supra note 1, § 75.
46. Suburban Sew 'N Sweep, Inc. v. Swiss-Bernina, Inc., 32 Fed. R. Serv. 2d
(Callaghan) 653, 657-58 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 24, 1981); United States v. Kelsey-Hayes
Wheel Co., 15 F.R.D. 461, 464 (E.D. Mich. 1954); C. McCormick, supra note 1, §
75, at 154; 8 J. Wigmore, supra note 1, § 2326.
47. See supra notes 29-46 and accompanying text.
48. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n of Am. v. Shamrock Broadcasting Co., 521 F.
Supp. 638, 641 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); R.J. Hereley & Son Co. v. Stotler & Co., 87 F.R.D.
358, 359 (N.D. Ill. 1980); Hercules Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 434 F. Supp. 136, 156 (D.
Del. 1977); Haymes v. Smith, 73 F.R.D. 572, 576 (W.D.N.Y. 1976); Duplan Corp.
v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146, 1161-62 (D.S.C. 1974); International
Tel. & Tel. Co. v. United Tel. Co., 60 F.R.D. 177, 185-86 (M.D. Fla. 1973);
Western Union Tel. Co. v. Baltimore & Ohio Tel. Co., 26 F. 55, 56-57 (S.D.N.Y.
1885).
49. Perrignon v. Bergen Brunswig Corp., 77 F.R.D. 455, 461 (N.D. Cal. 1978);
Hercules Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 434 F. Supp. 136, 156 (D. Del. 1977); Duplan Corp.
v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146, 1161-62 (D.S.C. 1974); International
Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. United Tel. Co., 60 F.R.D. 177, 185-86 (M.D. Fla. 1973);
United States v. Shibley, 112 F. Supp. 734, 742 (S.D. Cal. 1953); Western Union Tel.
Co. v. Baltimore & Ohio Tel. Co., 26 F. 55, 56-57 (S.D.N.Y. 1885).
50. United States v. Aronoff, 466 F. Supp. 855, 862 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); see, e.g.,
Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470-71 (1888); Kunglig Jarnvagsstyrelsen v. Dexter
& Carpenter, Inc., 32 F.2d 195, 201 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 280 U.S. 579 (1929);
Bohack Corp. v. Iowa Beef Processors, Inc., 31 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1205,
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great likelihood that the information disclosed is false or intended to
mislead the other party.5' Thus, pleading an "'advice of counsel"
defense, which puts the attorney's advice in issue,s2 is held to waive
the privilege as to all communications relating to that advice.5 3
Similarly, a subject matter waiver is found when the client testifies at
trial as to a privileged communication- or produces parts of commun-
ications from his attorney in discovery or at trial.55
The rationale for the "subject matter waiver" rule50 is one of fair-
1207 (E.D.N.Y. 1981); Garfinkle v. Arcata Nat'l Corp., 64 F.R.D. 688, 6S9
(S.D.N.Y. 1974). In Hearn v. Rhay, 68 F.R.D. 574 (E.D. Wash. 1975), the court
listed three factors common to cases in which courts have found waiver implied by
conduct other than actual disclosure: "(1) assertion of the privilege was a result of
some affirmative act, such as filing suit, by the asserting party; (2) through this
affirmative act, the asserting party put the protected information at issue by making
it relevant to the case; and (3) application of the privilege would have denied the
opposing party access to information vital to his defense." Id. at 581.
51. United States v. Aronoff, 466 F. Supp. 855, 862 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); see Teach-
ers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n of Am. v. Shamrock Broadcasting Co., 521 F. Supp. 638,
641 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (a partial disclosure must be made complete so as not to be
misleadingly one-sided). It would be "patently unfair" to uphold a claim of privilege
when it would effectively deny the opposing party an opportunity to uncover infor-
mation t6 challenge the assertions or disclosures. United States v. Aronoff, 466 F.
Supp. 855, 862 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); accord International Paper Co. v. Fibreboard
Corp., 63 F.R.D. 88, 92 (D. Del. 1974); American Optical Corp. v. Medtronic, Inc.,
56 F.R.D. 426, 432 (D. Mass. 1972).
52. E.g., United States v. Woodall, 438 F.2d 1317, 1323-24 (5th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 403 U.S. 933 (1971); Trans World Airlines v. Hughes, 332 F.2d 602, 615 (2d
Cir. 1964), cert. dismissed, 380 U.S. 248 (1965); Barr Marine Prods. Co. v. Borg-
Warner Corp., 84 F.R.D. 631, 635 (E.D. Pa. 1979); Handgards, Inc. v. Johnson &
Johnson, 413 F. Supp. 926, 929 (N.D. Cal. 1976). The defense involves a "deliberate
injection of the advice of counsel into a case" as an issue. Id.
53. Handgards, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson, 413 F. Supp. 926, 929 (N.D. Cal.
1976); Smith v. Bentley, 9 F.R.D. 489, 490 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
54. E.g., Handgards, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson, 413 F. Supp. 926, 929 (N.D.
Cal. 1976); American Optical Corp. v. Medtronic, Inc., 56 F.R.D. 426, 432 (D.
Mass. 1972). The privilege is also held waived when the privileged document is used
to refresh the recollection of a witness. Marshall v. United States Postal Serv., 88
F.R.D. 348, 350 (D.D.C. 1980); R.J. Hereley & Son Co. v. Stotler & Co., 87 F.R.D.
358, 359 (N.D. Ill. 1980); Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. Underwriters Labora-
tories, Inc., 81 F.R.D. 8, 9 (N.D. Ill. 1978); Bailey v. Meister Brau, Inc., 57 F.R.D.
11, 13 (N.D. Ill. 1972); see Fed. R. Evid. 612 (counsel entitled to inspect any writing
used by a witness to refresh his recollection).
55. E.g., Eagle-Picher Indus. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 27 Fed. R. Serv.
2d (Callaghan) 186, 187 (S.D. Ill. 1978); SEC v. Dresser Indus., 453 F. Supp. 573,
576 (D.D.C. 1978), aff'd en banc, 628 F.2d 1368 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
993 (1980); Haymes v. Smith, 73 F.R.D. 572, 576-77 (W.D.N.Y. 1976); Diematic
Mfg. Corp. v. Packaging Indus., 199 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 761, 763-64 (S.D.N.Y. 1976);
Western Union Tel. Co. v. Baltimore & Ohio Tel. Co., 26 F. 55, 55-56 (S.D.N.Y.
1885).
56. This rule against partial or selective disclosure is referred to by Wigmore as
"waiver by implication." 8 J. Wigmore, supra note 1, § 2327, at 635-36. One court
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ness.57 It is designed to prevent the client from using the attorney-
client privilege offensively, as an "additional weapon."' 8 Sometimes,
however, a partial disclosure will not place the communications in
issue. An inadvertent 59 or very minor disclosure " of privileged mate-
rial may not constitute an attempt, through selective disclosure, to use
the privilege offensively. 6' When the opposing party will suffer no
prejudice, courts have been inclined to limit the waiver to what was
actually disclosed .62
The traditional strict standard of waiver has continuing application
to claims of privilege. Courts, in implementing liberal discovery rules,
has termed it an "involuntary waiver." Teachers Iris. & Annuity Ass'n of Am. v.
Shamrock Broadcasting Co., 521 F. Supp. 638, 641 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). The term
"subject matter waiver" more accurately describes the situation. E.g., Duplan Corp.
v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 540 F.2d 1215, 1222-23 (4th Cir. 1976); EZ Loader Boat
Trailers, Inc. v. Shoreline Trailers, Inc., 207 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1002, 1004 (N.D. Tex.
1979).
57. In re LTV Sec. Litig., 89 F.R.D. 595, 605 (N.D. Tex. 1981); Hercules Inc. v.
Exxon Corp., 434 F. Supp. 136, 156 (D. Del. 1977); International Bus. Machs. Corp.
v. Sperry Rand Corp., 44 F.R.D. 10, 13 (D. Del. 1968); Bierman v. Marcus, 122 F.
Supp. 250, 252 (D.N.J. 1954); see Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n of Am. v. Shamrock
Broadcasting Co., 521 F. Supp. 638, 641 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). Wigmore has stated the
principle as follows: "[W]hen [the client's] conduct touches a certain point of disclo-
sure, fairness requires that his privilege shall cease whether he intended that result or
not. He cannot be allowed, after disclosing as much as he pleases, to withhold the
remainder." 8 J. Wigmore, supra note 1, § 2327, at 636. Even an inadvertent
disclosure may waive the privilege as to documents not disclosed if fairness so
requires. Id.; First Wis. Mtge. Trust v. First Wis. Corp., 86 F.R.D. 160, 173 (E.D.
Wis. 1980).
58. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n of Am. v. Shamrock Broadcasting Co., 521 F.
Supp. 638, 641 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); International Bus. Machs. Corp. v. Sperry Rand
Corp., 44 F.R.D. 10, 13 (D. Del. 1968); C. McCormick, supra note 1, § 93, at 197
(quoting Green v. Crapo, 181 Mass. 55, 62, 62 N.E. 956, 959 (1902) (Holmes, C.J.)).
Wigmore states that the privilege is "intended only as an incidental means of defense,
and not as an independent means of attack, and to use it in the latter character is to
abandon it in the former." 8 J. Wigmore, supra note 1, § 2327, at 638; accord 16
Minn. L. Rev. 818, 825 (1932). The rule "has given rise to such metaphors as the
privilege may not be used as both a shield and a sword, and, the client may not have
his cake and eat it too." Byrnes v. IDS Realty Trust, 85 F.R.D. 679, 688-89
(S.D.N.Y. 1980); accord United States v. Woodall, 438 F.2d 1317, 1326 (5th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 933 (1971).
59. E.g., Weil v. Investment/Indicators, Research & Management, 647 F.2d 18,
24-25 (9th Cir. 1981); First Wis. Mtge. Trust v. First Wis. Corp., 86 F.R.D. 160, 173
(E.D. Wis. 1980).
60. E.g., Champion Int'l Corp. v. International Paper Co., 486 F. Supp. 1328,
1333 (N.D. Ga. 1980); Goldman, Sachs & Co. v. Blondis, 412 F. Supp. 286, 288-89
(N.D. Ill. 1976).
61. See supra notes 47-58 and accompanying text.
62. Weil v. Investment/Indicators, Research & Management, 647 F.2d 18, 25
(9th Cir. 1981); First Wis. Mtge. Trust v. First Wis. Corp., 86 F.R.D. 160, 174
(E.D. Wis. 1980); United States v. Aronoff, 466 F. Supp. 855, 862-63 (S.D.N.Y.
1979).
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look with disfavor upon attempts to exempt relevant information from
the truth-finding process. 63 It is nevertheless widely recognized that
in certain circumstances a finding of waiver is not always appropri-
ate.6
4
B. Relaxation of the Traditional Standard
When waiver would inhibit implementation of important public
policies, the traditional standard has been relaxed despite the under-
mining of absolute confidentiality.6 5  For example, courts discourage
eavesdropping and theft of communications by sustaining claims of
privilege 66 when a third party has overheard the communication
without the client's knowledge or has surreptitiously obtained the
privileged material.6 7  These cases hold that the privilege is not
waived when the attorney and client have taken reasonable precau-
tions to ensure confidentiality, but confidentiality has nonetheless
been lost.6 8
Further, many courts have expanded the scope of the privilege to
cover communications with employees or agents of the attorney with
more than ministerial duties. 69  The complexity of the law often
63. Osterneck v. E.T. Barwick Indus., 82 F.R.D. 81. 84-85 (N.D. Ga. 1979);
Magida ex rel. Vulcan Detinning Co. v. Continental Can Co., 12 F.R.D. 74. 76-77
(S.D.N.Y. 1951).
64. E.g., In re Horowitz, 482 F.2d 72, 80-81 (2d Cir.) (disclosure to accountant
does not automatically result in waiver), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 867 (1973); In re
LTV Sec. Litig., 89 F.R.D. 595, 604-05 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (joint defense exception to
general waiver rule); Burlington Indus. v. Exxon Corp., 65 F.R.D. 26, 45 (D. Md.
1974) (waiver to be considered in light of the importance of facilitating negotiated
settlements).
65. See, e.g., United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 921 (2d Cir. 1961) ("com-
plexities of modern existence" require extension of the privilege's protection to ac-
countants and other experts consulted by attorney): In re LTV See. Litig., 89 F.R.D.
595, 604 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (recognizing joint defense exception to general rule of
absolute confidentiality); Burlington Indus. v. Exxon Corp., 65 F.R.D. 26, 45 (D.
Md. 1974) (public policy of encouraging negotiated settlements requires a finding of
no waiver of privilege by disclosure to opposing party).
66. See 2 D. Louisell & C. Mueller, supra note 1, § 209, at 529. This policy
consideration is grounded in the realization that a finding of waiver "is unsupport-
able in an era of electronic eavesdropping and heightened dependence upon intercep-
tible communications by telephone and the mails.... [T]here is no reason to
impose upon the client absolute responsibility and absolute risk." Id. (footnote omit-
ted); accord C. McCormick, supra note 1, § 75.
67. United States v. Sindona, 636 F.2d 792, 805 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451
U.S. 912 (1981); In re Grand Jury Proceedings Involving Berkley & Co., 466 F.
Supp. 863, 869 (D. Minn. 1979), aff'd, 629 F.2d 548 (8th Cir. 1980).
68. E.g., Black v. United States, 385 U.S. 26, 26-27 (1966) (per curiam); In re
Grand Jury Proceedings Involving Berkley & Co., 466 F. Supp. 863, 869 (D. Minn.
1979), aff'd, 629 F.2d 548 (8th Cir. 1980); see Dunn Chem. Co. v. Sybron Corp.,
1975-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 60,561, at 67,461 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); 2 J. Weinstein & M.
Berger, supra note 4, 503(b)[02].
69. United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 921 (2d Cir. 1961). The "usual func-
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requires that the attorney seek the help of experts in order to advise his
client properly. 70 Thus, when an attorney consults an accountant or
other expert for assistance in providing legal advice to a client, no
waiver of the privilege will result. 71
Additionally, a number of courts have endorsed a "joint defense"
exception to the strict waiver standard. They extend the privilege's
protection to the disclosure of information concerning common issues
to actual or prospective codefendants, when such disclosure is made to
facilitate a joint defense. 72 Public interest in the efficient administra-
tion of justice is served by the ability of codefendants and their attor-
neys to undertake a cooperative preparation of their common de-
fense. 73  As stated by one court, "recognition [of a joint defense
exception] makes savings in expense and effort likely. ' 74  The joint
tionaries of modern legal practice," such as secretaries, stenographers and paralegals,
are ordinarily viewed as extensions of the attorney for purposes of the privilege. 2 D.
Louisell & C. Mueller, supra note 1, § 209, at 532; C. McCormick, supra note 1, §
91, at 188-89.
70. United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 921 (2d Cir. 1961); 2 D. Loulsell & C.
Mueller, supra note 1, § 209, at 529-31.
71. See In re Horowitz, 482 F.2d 72, 80-81 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 867
(1973); United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 922-23 (2d Cir. 1961); Eglin Fed.
Credit Union v. Cantor, 31 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 713, 715 (N.D. Ga. 1981);
United States v. Schmidt, 360 F. Supp. 339, 345-47 (M.D. Pa. 1973); United States v.
Jacobs, 322 F. Supp. 1299, 1303 (C.D. Cal. 1971); 2 D. Louisell & C. Mueller, supra
note 1, § 209, at 529. Disclosure to an expert for reasons other than assisting the
attorney, however, does not advance the policy of providing the best possible repre-
sentation and will therefore result in waiver. In re Horowitz, 482 F.2d 72, 81 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 867 (1973); Himmelfarb v. United States, 175 F,2d 924,
939 (9th Cir. 1949); Eglin Fed. Credit Union v. Cantor, 31 Fed. R. Serv. 2d
(Callaghan) 713, 715-16 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
72. Wilson P. Abraham Constr. Corp. v. Armco Steel Corp., 559 F.2d 250, 253
(5th Cir. 1977); Hunydee v. United States, 355 F.2d 183, 184-85 (9th Cir. 1965);
Continental Oil Co. v. United States, 330 F.2d 347, 3,49-50 (9th Cir. 1964); In re
LTV Sec. Litig., 89 F.R.D. 595, 604 (N.D. Tex. 1981); Transmirra Prods. Corp. v.
Monsanto Chem. Co., 26 F.R.D. 572, 576-77 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). The "joint defense"
privilege applies to shared communications "to the extent that they concern common
issues and are intended to facilitate representation in possible subsequent proceed-
ings." Hunydee v. United States, 355 F.2d 183, 185 (9th Cir. 1965). The privilege is
available to co-respondents in a grand jury investigation as well as to parties made
codefendants by formal indictment. Continental Oil Co. v. United States, 330 F.2d
347, 348-50 (9th Cir. 1964). The privilege also applies in a civil proceeding. Wilson
P. Abraham Constr. Corp. v. Armco Steel Corp., 559 F.2d 250, 253 (5th Cir. 1977);
cf. Burlington Indus. v. Exxon Corp., 65 F.R.D. 26, 43-45 (D. Md. 1974) (disclosure
by party's counsel to nonparty third person with whom party had a "community of
interest" does not waive the privilege).
73. Welles, A Survey of Attorney-Client Privilege in Joint Defense, 35 U. Miami
L. Rev. 321, 325 (1981); see Hunydee v. United States, 355 F.2d 183, 185 (9th Cir.
1965); In re LTV See. Litig., 89 F.R.D. 595, 604 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
74. In re LTV Sec. Litig., 89 F.R.D. 595, 604 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
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defense exception is consistent with the principle of confidentiality,5
because the disclosure is made in confidence and "not . . .for the
purpose of allowing unlimited publication and use."-76
Strong public policy in favor of encouraging the voluntary settle-
ment of civil litigation is also held to justify a relaxation of the strict
standard of waiver. 77  In the course of settlement negotiations, an
attorney may disclose privileged communications to the opposing
party in contending that the law or facts favor his client's position. 7
The few cases on point have found that although the pririlege was
waived as to what was intentionally disclosed, there was no subject
matter waiver.79
Although a liberal discovery policy conceptually conflicts with the
privilege, expediting discovery in complex litigation may call for a
relaxation of the traditional confidentiality requirement.80  Because
massive discovery can result in inadvertent production of privileged
material,8 ' a finding of waiver would effectively penalize efforts to
comply with expedited discovery orders.8 2 Relaxation of the strict
75. Welles, supra note 73, at 325.
76. Wilson P. Abraham Constr. Corp. v. Armco Steel Corp., 559 F.2d 2.50, 253
(5th Cir. 1977).
77. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated July 13, 1979, 478 F. Supp. 368, 373 (E.D.
Wis. 1979); Burlington Indus. v. Exxon Corp., 65 F.R.D. 26, 45 (D. Md. 1974);
Sylgab Steel & Wire Corp. v. Imoco-Gateway Corp., 62 F.R.D. 454, 45S (N.D. Ill.
1974), aff'd mem., 534 F.2d 330 (7th Cir. 1976); American Optical Corp. v. Med-
tronic, Inc., 56 F.R.D. 426, 431 (D. Mass. 1972); International Bus. Machs. Corp. v.
Sperry Rand Corp., 44 F.R.D. 10, 13 (D. Del. 1968).
78. Burlington Indus. v. Exxon Corp., 65 F.R.D. 26, 46 (D. Md. 1974); Sylgab
Steel & Wire Corp. v. Imoco-Gateway Corp., 62 F.R.D. 454, 457-58 (N.D. Ill.
1974), aff'd mem., 534 F.2d 330 (7th Cir. 1976); American Optical Corp. v. Med-
tronic, Inc., 56 F.R.D. 426, 431 (D. Mass. 1972); International Bus. Machs. Corp. '.
Sperry Rand Corp., 44 F.R.D. 10, 13 (D. Del. 1968).
79. Burlington Indus. v. Exxon Corp., 65 F.R.D. 26, 46 (D. Md. 1974); Sylgab
Steel & Wire Corp. v. Imoco-Gateway Corp., 62 F.R.D. 454, 457-58 (N.D. Ill.
1974), aff'd mem., 534 F.2d 330 (7th Cir. 1976); American Optical Corp. v. Med-
tronic, Inc., 56 F.R.D. 426, 431 (D. Mass. 1972); International Bus. Machs. Corp. v.
Sperry Rand Corp., 44 F.R.D. 10, 13 (D. Del. 1968).
80. Permian Corp. v. United States, 6 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. (Callaghan) 1188,
1200 (D.D.C. 1980) (no waiver by inadvertent production in course of expedited
discovery of two million documents within a ten-week period), rervd on other
grounds, 665 F.2d 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Champion Int'l Corp. v. International
Paper Co., 486 F. Supp. 1328, 1333 (N.D. Ga. 1980) (no waiver by inadvertent
disclosure in the course of exhaustive discovery); SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 70
F.R.D. 508, 520 (D. Conn.) (no waiver by inadvertent disclosure during extensive
document production), appeal dismissed, 534 F.2d 1031 (2d Cir. 1976); Control
Data Corp. v. International Bus. Machs. Corp., 16 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan)
1233, 1235 (D. Minn. 1972) (same).
81. Control Data Corp. v. International Bus. Machs. Corp., 16 Fed. R. Serv. 2d
(Callaghan) 1233, 1235 (D. Minn. 1972).
82. See id. at 1234-35.
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standard is justified if the party claiming the privilege has taken
reasonable precautions by screening the documents as carefully as
possible.8 3 Failure to take precautions, however, will result in waiver
through application of the traditional standard."4
Tension between expeditious discovery and retention of the privi-
lege can be obviated by agreement of the parties, given effect in a
protective order issued by the court.85 For example, in Eutectic
Corp. v. Metco, Inc.,86 the court issued a protective order contemplat-
ing "a special method of discovery"87 and expressly providing that
disclosure of privileged material would not operate as a waiver. 88
Similarly, the court in Control Data Corp. v. International Business
Machines Corp.89 issued an order providing that as long as IBM made
reasonable inspection of its documents, the privilege would not be
held waived. 90 The courts in both Eutectic and Control Data were
motivated by the important policy of facilitating discovery. As the
Eutectic court noted, there was "no sound reason of public policy to
rewrite an agreement which facilitates disclosure, closely protects a
83. See id.
84. Ranney-Brown Distribs. v. E.T. Barwick Indus., 75 F.R.D. 3, 5-6 (S.D.
Ohio 1977) (dictum); United States v. Kelsey-Hayes Wheel Co., 15 F.R.D. 461, 465
(E.D. Mich. 1954).
85. Transamerica Computer Co. v. International Bus. Machs. Corp., 573 F.2d
646, 652-53 (9th Cir. 1978); Eutectic Corp. v. Metco, Inc., 61 F.R.D. 35, 42-43
(E.D.N.Y. 1973); cf. Permian Corp. v. United States, 6 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. (Cal-
laghan) 1188, 1200-02 (D.D.C. 1980) (express stipulation to protect privileged infor-
mation that might be inadvertently produced), rev'd on other grounds, 665 F.2d
1214 (D.C. Cir. 1981); GAF Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 85 F.R.D. 46, 48
(S.D.N.Y. 1979) (protective order provided that documents produced could only be
used for the purpose of prosecuting the present action and not for any other purpose),
Control Data Corp. v. International Bus. Machs. Corp., 16 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Cal-
laghan) 1233, 1234-35 (D. Minn. 1972) (order protecting inadvertent disclosure
analogized to protective order in Transamerica Computer Co., 573 F.2d at 652-53).
86. 61 F.R.D. 35 (E.D.N.Y. 1973).
87. Id. at 42.
88. Id. The protective order provided that the privilege would not be deemed
waived by disclosure unless such waiver was "made expressly in writing." Id. at 37.
89. 16 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1233 (D. Minn. 1972).
90. Id. at 1234, 1237. The district court had instituted an accelerated discovery
program, pursuant to which IBM copied 80 million Control Data documents and
Control Data sent, over a period of time, a staff of 61 persons to inspect IBM's
documents. This program, however, resulted in the inadvertent production of a
number of privileged documents by IBM, despite its efforts to screen them. IBM then
placed a lawyer at its document storage room, where Control Data was microfilming
the material, for a final inspection before permitting Control Data to duplicate
them. Control Data complained that this procedure seriously impeded its discovery
efforts and asked the court to order that the IBM lawyer be removed. In acceding to
Control Data's request, the court forbade any later "argument that the privilege had
been waived merely because the document had been seen by CDC and perhaps
copied," provided the parties made reasonable efforts of pre-inspection. Id. at 1234,
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legitimate privilege, and contemplates a cooperative effort by both
parties." 91
The interests in expediting discovery in complex litigation would be
served by adoption of the protective order approach, which allows
accommodation of the policies of full disclosure and protecting attor-
ney-client communications.9 2 To be truly effective, a protective or-
der issued in one action must be adhered to in an)y later action in
which the same waiver issue arises. The issue in fact arose in two
antitrust suits brought against IBM after Control Data, when the
plaintiffs contended that IBM's disclosure under the Control Data
order had worked a waiver. In Transamerica Computer Co. v. Inter-
national Business Machines Corp.,9 3 the Ninth Circuit found no
waiver, emphasizing the extraordinary circumstances of the acceler-
ated discovery9 4 and recognizing that the judge in Control Data had
effectively issued a protective order.95 In International Business Ma-
chines Corp. v. United States,96 however, the Second Circuit resisted
the claim of privilege. Although the court dismissed on jurisdictional
grounds an appeal from the district court's finding of waiver,9 7 dictum
suggests it agreed with the result the district court had reached. The
court of appeals reasoned that at least part of the privileged material
in Control Data must have been disclosed before the order was is-
sued.98 Had there been no question that the disclosure was made in
reliance on the Control Data order, the district court might have
abided by it. To the extent that a protective order shielded the privi-
leged material at the time of disclosure, a claim of privilege in a later
91. 61 F.R.D. at 43; accord Champion Int'l Corp. v. International Paper Co.,
486 F. Supp. 1328, 1333 (N.D. Ga. 1980): Schenectady Chems., Inc. v. General
Elec. Co., 184 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 208, 210 (N.D.N.Y. 1974); see Control Data Corp. v.
International Bus. Machs. Corp., 16 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1233, 1236-37 (D.
Minn. 1972).
92. See Kaminsky, Proposed Federal Discovery Rules for Complex Civil Litiga-
tion, 48 Fordham L. Rev. 907, 927-28 (1980).
93. 573 F.2d 646 (9th Cir. 1978).
94. Id. at 651.
95. Id. at 652-53. Relying on Judge Neville's holding in Control Data, the court
observed that "[a]s the judicial officer directly in charge of supervising the discovery
proceedings in that litigation, he was in an ideal position to determine whether the
timetable he himself had imposed was so stringent that, as a practical matter, it
effectively denied IBM the opportunity to claim the attorney-client privilege for
documents it was producing for inspection by CDC." Id. at 652.
96. 480 F.2d 293 (2d Cir. 1973) (en banc), motion to file cert. denied, 416 U.S.
979 (1974).
97. Id. at 295.
98. Id. at 299. Judge Mulligan, who wrote the majority opinion, had discussed
the facts fully in his dissent to the panel decision. 471 F.2d 507. 522-23 (2d Cir. 1972)
(Mulligan, J., dissenting), appeal dismissed en bane, 480 F.2d 293 (2d Cir. 1973),
motion to file cert. denied, 416 U.S. 979 (1974).
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action should be sustained. By discouraging litigants from fully coop-
erating in discovery for fear of losing the privilege,0 9 application of the
traditional strict waiver standard prevents the implementation of lib-
eral discovery policy that a more flexible approach would advance.
As indicated by the preceding discussion, courts that have relaxed
the strict standard of waiver have been motivated by a desire to
implement policies other than the one underlying the privilege. 00
Policy considerations alone, however, are insufficient to justify a de-
parture from the traditional rule. Cases that have sustained the privi-
lege despite the absence of absolute confidentiality can be analyzed as
establishing two conditions that must first be met: (1) The circum-
stances must indicate a clear intention by the client to retain the
privilege; and (2) there must be no attempt to use the privilege offen-
sively. Because the attorney-client privilege is usually guarded jeal-
ously, 1' 1 whenever a client does not take obvious or routine steps to
preserve the privilege he is presumed to be indifferent to its loss.' 02
Thus, if confidentiality is breached through his own carelessness or
lack of precautions, an intention to waive will be inferred and waiver
will result. 0 3 On the other hand, if a disclosure results even though
reasonable precautions were taken, no intent to waive the privilege
can be inferred. 10 4 Further, when the client controls dissemination,
making disclosure only to those necessary for the providing of legal
advice, or to adversaries in a settlement negotiation, no inference of
intention to waive may be drawn.105
99. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981) ("An uncertain
privilege, or one which purports to be certain but results in widely varying applica-
tions by the courts, is little better than no privilege at all."); Kaminsky, supra note
92, at 927 & n.99 (fear due to strict view of waiver).
100. See supra notes 65-92 and accompanying text.
101. International Bus. Machs. Corp. v. United States, 471 F.2d 507, 509 (2d Cir.
1972), appeal dismissed en banc, 480 F.2d 293 (2d Cir. 1973), motion to file cert,
denied, 416 U.S. 979 (1974); C. McCormick, supra note 1, § 87, at 176.
102. In re Horowitz, 482 F.2d 72, 82 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 867 (1973);
Suburban Sew 'N Sweep, Inc. v. Swiss-Bernina, Inc.. 32 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Cal-
laghan) 653, 657 (N.D, Ill. Aug. 24, 1981); In re Victor, 422 F. Supp. 475, 476
(S.D.N.Y. 1976).
103. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
104. United States v. Sindona, 636 F.2d 792, 804-05 (2d Cir. 1980) (eavesdropper
overheard communication), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 912 (1981); Permian Corp. v.
United States, 6 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. (Callaghan) 1188, 1200 (D.D.C. 1980) (inadver-
tent disclosure during massive discovery), rev'd on other grounds, 665 F.2d 1214
(D.C. Cir. 1981); Champion Int'l Corp. v. International Paper Co., 486 F. Supp.
1328, 1333 (N.D. Ga. 1980) (same); In re Grand Jury Proceedings Involving Berkley
& Co., 466 F. Supp. 863, 869 (D. Minn. 1979) (documents stolen), afl'd, 629 F.2d
548 (8th Cir. 1980); Control Data Corp. v. International Bus. Machs. Corp., 16 Fed.
R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1233, 1234 (D. Minn. 1972) (inadvertent disclosure during
massive discovery).
105. See Wilson P. Abraham Constr. Corp. v. Armco Steel Corp., 559 F.2d 250,
253 (5th Cir. 1977) (disclosure to codefendant); Hunydee v. United States, 355 F.2d
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The second condition that must be met before a court will relax the
waiver standard to effectuate policy is grounded in a consideration of
fairness: The disclosure must not involve an attempt to use the privi-
lege offensively.' 06  For example, when a party has inadvertently
produced privileged documents in the course of massive discovery,
and the court is satisfied that the disclosure is truly inadvertent, no
fairness inquiry is necessary because there is no selective disclosure in
an attempt to mislead.'0 7 Nor is such an attempt involved when a
third party has eavesdropped on attorney-client communications,'
0
or when disclosures are limited to accountants or other experts, or to
codefendants, solely for the purpose of rendering legal advice. 09 A
similar rationale is used in relation to disclosures made during settle-
ment negotiations. Courts that have faced the issue have found that no
unfairness results from such partial disclosures." 0  The policy of en-
couraging settlements and promoting judicial economy overrides the
fact of voluntariness and possible selectivity in disclosure. Moreover, if
a party believes that he is being prejudiced by selective disclosures, he
can break off negotiations and pursue a judicial remedy.
183, 184-85 (9th Cir. 1965) (same); Continental Oil Co. v. United States. 330 F.2d
347, 350 (9th Cir. 1964) (same); United States v. Kovel. 296 F.2d 918, 9-22-23 (2d
Cir. 1961) (disclosure to accountant); Sylgab Steel & Wire Corp. v. Imoco-Gateway
Corp., 62 F.R.D. 454, 458 (N.D. Ill. 1974) (disclosure during settlement negotia-
tions), aff'd mem., 534 F.2d 330 (7th Cir. 1976); United States v. Schmidt. 360 F.
Supp. 339, 346-47 (M.D. Pa. 1973) (disclosure to accountant): American Optical
Corp. v. Medtronic, Inc., 56 F.R.D. 426, 431 (D. Mass. 1972) (disclosure during
settlement negotiations); United States v. Jacobs, 322 F. Supp. 1299, 1303 (C.D. Cal.
1971) (disclosure to accountant); International Bus. Machs. Corp. v. Sperry Rand
Corp., 44 F.R.D. 10, 13 (D. Del. 1968) (disclosure during settlement negotiations).
106. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n of Am. v. Shamrock Broadcasting Co., 521 F.
Supp. 638, 641 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F.
Supp. 1146, 1161-62 (D.S.C. 1974); Bierman v. Marcus, 122 F. Supp. 250, 2.52
(D.N.J. 1954); see supra notes 47-62 and accompanying text.
107. See supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text. In the unlikely event that the
disclosure was not truly inadvertent, a subject matter inquiry may preclude relaxa-
tion of the waiver standard. If the party learns that privileged material has been
inadvertently disclosed and does not recall the documents, a waiver as to those
materials may result. Permian Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214, 12200 n.11
(D.C. Cir. 1981).
108. A disclosure not contemplated, but indeed guarded against, cannot be an
offensive use of the privilege. See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
109. Because of the nature of the disclosure, the courts do not even address the
fairness issue. Rather, the inquiry is solely in terms of policy and confidentiality.
E.g., In re Horowitz, 482 F.2d 72, 80-82 (2d Cir.) (accountant), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 867 (1973); In re LTV Sec. Litig., 89 F.R.D. 595, 604 (N.D. Tex. 1981)
(codefendant).
110. See Burlington Indus. v. Exxon Corp., 65 F.R.D. 26, 46 (D. Md. 1974);
Sylgab Steel & Wire Corp. v. Imoco-Gateway Corp., 62 F.R.D. 454, 458 (N.D. Ill.
1974), aff'd mem., 534 F.2d 330 (7th Cir. 1976); American Optical Corp. v. Med-
tronic, Inc., 56 F.R.D. 426, 431 (D. Mass. 1972); International Bus. Machs. Corp. v.
Sperry Rand Corp., 44 F.R.D. 10, 13 (D. Del. 1968).
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II. DisCLOSURE TO THE SEC-THE LIMITED WAIVER
A disclosure of privileged material to the SEC invites an evaluation
of the circumstances to determine whether the waiver standard should
be relaxed. Although the SEC has subpoena power,"' most of its
investigations are conducted privately, through informal inquiry, in-
terviewing and review of documents." 2  In this regard, voluntary
disclosures to the SEC "should be encouraged rather than requiring
that agency requests or subpoenas be fought to the hilt.""13  Relaxa-
tion of the waiver standard with respect to matters disclosed in non-
public investigations serves the important policy of encouraging coop-
eration with the SEC. As stated by one court, "voluntary cooperation
with the Securities and Exchange Commission ...would be substan-
tially curtailed if such cooperation were deemed to be a waiver of a
corporation's attorney-client privilege."" 4
A large investigation may require the review of millions of docu-
ments or the interviewing of many witnesses;" 5 such a massive ex-
penditure of time and effort may be, as a practical matter, beyond the
limited resources of an agency such as the SEC."0  To lessen the
burden, the SEC may request documents protected by the attorney-
client privilege." 7  If such reports are disclosed, the conventional
notion that the privilege is based on absolute confidentiality" 8 re-
quires a finding of waiver. Application of the strict waiver standard,
however, would be a disincentive to cooperation."9 To encourage
cooperation, several courts have found a "limited waiver," in which
111. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 21(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(b) (1976).
112. E. Brodsky, Guide to Securities Litigation 3-7 (1974); 3 L. Loss, Securities
Regulation 1955 (2d ed. 1961). The SEC "may, in its discretion, make such Investiga-
tions" into activities within the market "as it deems necessary." Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, § 21(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(a) (1976).
113. Byrnes v. IDS Realty Trust, 85 F.R.D. 679, 688 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
114. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated July 13, 1979, 478 F. Supp. 368, 372-73
(E.D. Wis. 1979).
115. E.g., Permian Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214, 1216 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
116. In re LTV See. Litig., 89 F.R.D. 595, 619 (N.D. Tex. 1981); Block & Barton,
supra note 12, at 31.
117. Permian Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214, 1216 (D.C. Cir. 1981); In re
Weiss, 596 F.2d 1185, 1186 (4th Cir. 1979) (per curiam); Diversified Indus. v.
Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 599 (1977), rev'd on other grounds en banc, 572 F.2d 608
(8th Cir. 1978); Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n of Am. v. Shamrock Broadcasting
Co., 521 F. Supp. 638, 639-40 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Byrnes v. IDS Realty Trust, 85
F.R.D. 679, 682 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); In re Penn Cent. Commercial Paper Litig., 61
F.R.D. 453, 456-58 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
118. See supra pt. I(A).
119. In re LTV See. Litig., 89 F.R.D. 595, 619 (N.D. Tex. 1981); Byrnes v. IDS
Realty Trust, 85 F.R.D. 679, 688 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); In re Grand Jury Subpoena
Dated July 13, 1979, 478 F. Supp. 368, 372-73 (E.D. Wis. 1979); Block & Barton,
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the privilege is waived only with respect to the SEC.'20 To warrant
this relaxation, the disclosure must be made under circumstances
indicating both that the disclosing party intended to protect the privi-
lege to the greatest extent possible, and that no attempt to use the
privilege unfairly was involved.' 2' By failing to give each of these
considerations its proper weight,' 22 courts confronting the issue in the
SEC limited waiver context have reached disparate results.123
Analysis of the limited waiver situation is simplified by the circum-
stances of the disclosure. Limited disclosure to the SEC is distinguish-
able from partial disclosure cases,' 2 4 which require an inquiry into
unfairness and prejudice.'2 5 Because the limited waiver situation
involves a full disclosure,' 2 6 there is no attempt to use the privilege
offensively. ' 27 Application of the doctrine of subject matter waiver is
supra note 12, at 32. It appears that a more flexible standard is warranted by Fed. RI.
Evid. 501, which provides that privileges are to be "'interpreted . ..in light of
reason and experience." Id. The Supreme Court stated that rule 501 acknowledges
the "authority of the federal courts to continue the evolutionary development of
testimonial privileges." Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 47 (1980). In enact-
ing rule 501 instead of the rigid proposed rules, 'Congress manifested an affirmative
intention not to freeze the law of privilege. Its purpose rather was to *provide the
courts with the flexibility to develop rules of privilege on a case-by-case basis,' and to
leave the door open to change." Id. (citations omitted): accord SEC v. Gulf & W.
Indus., 32 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 279, 282 (D.D.C. July 2.3, 1981): In re LTV
See. Litig., 89 F.R.D. 595, 621 (N.D. Tex. 1981): Champion Int'l Corp. v. Interna-
tional Paper Co., 486 F. Supp. 1328, 1332 (N.D. Ga. 1980): 2 D. Louisell & C.
Mueller, supra note 1, § 200, at 399-400.
120. Diversified Indus. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 611 (8th Cir. 1978) (en bane):
Byrnes v. IDS Realty Trust, 85 F.R.D. 679, 687-89 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); see Teachers
Ins. & Annuity Ass'n of Am. v. Shamrock Broadcasting Co., 521 F. Supp. 63S, 646
(S.D.N.Y. 1981).
121. See supra notes 101-10 and accompanying text.
122. E.g., Diversified Indus. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 611 (8th Cir. 1978) (en
bane) (fails to consider that voluntary disclosure indicates no intent to preserve
confidentiality); Byrnes v. IDS Realty Trust, 85 F.R.D. 679, 688 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)
(same).
123. Compare Permian Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214, 1222 (D.C. Cir.
1981) (disclosure results in general waiver), with Diversified Indus. v. Meredith, 572
F.2d 596, 611 (8th Cir. 1978) (en bane) (disclosure results in limited waiver), with
Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n of Am. v. Shamrock Broadcasting Co., 521 F. Supp.
638, 644-45 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (disclosure results in general waiver unless a reservation
of privilege is made).
124. See supra notes 50-55 and accompanying text.
125. See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
126. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n of Am. v. Shamrock Broadcasting Co., 521 F.
Supp. 638, 641 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); see Diversified Indus. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596,
611 (8th Cir. 1978) (en bane) (all materials disclosed); Byrnes v. IDS Realty Trust, 85
F.R.D. 679, 682 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (entire memorandum disclosed).
127. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n of Am. v. Shamrock Broadcasting Co., 521 F.
Supp. 638, 641 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Byrnes v. IDS Realty Trust, 85 F.R.D. 679, 689
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thus analytically inappropriate. Because the SEC disclosure situation
involves policy concerns that militate against a finding of waiver, 2 8
the only remaining consideration is whether the disclosing party's acts
evidence an intent to protect confidentiality to the greatest extent
possible. 129
A. The Liberal Approach
The Eighth Circuit, in Diversified Industries v. Meredith,130 and
the Southern District of New York, in Byrnes v. IDS Realty Trust,'3'
have adopted a liberal approach to the waiver issue which virtually
ignores the confidentiality requirement underlying the privilege.
These courts have held that a voluntary disclosure to the SEC made in
the course of a nonpublic investigation effects a waiver only as to the
SEC. 32 The courts thus have deemed the policy consideration suffi-
ciently important in itself to justify a relaxation of the strict standard
of waiver. 133 In both Diversified and Byrnes, the courts failed to
consider disclosure to the SEC in terms of whether it met the privi-
lege's traditional secrecy requirement.134 In both cases the disclosures
were made voluntarily, 135 without any attempt to ensure confidential-
(S.D.N.Y. 1980). Theoretically, there could be a case in which, under the guise of
cooperation, a corporation made only partial disclosure to the SEC. Research has
revealed no cases in which the SEC or any private party has claimed that the
corporation waived its privilege by withholding some information. In such a case,
the disclosure would require a subject matter waiver.
128. See supra notes 65-92 and accompanying text.
129. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n of Am. v. Shamrock Broadcasting Co., 521 F.
Supp. 638, 642 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). "[T]he issue is not whether the opposing party has a
fair picture of the nature of the communication, but whether the confidentiality of
the communication integral to the attorney-client privilege has been breached." Id.
at 645; see supra notes 101-05 and accompanying text.
130. 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1978) (en bane).
131. 85 F.R.D. 679 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
132. Diversified Indus. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 611 (8th Cir. 1978) (en banc):
Byrnes v. IDS Realty Trust, 85 F.R.D. 679, 688-89 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
133. Diversified Indus. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 611 (8th Cir. 1978) (en bane):
Byrnes v. IDS Realty Trust, 85 F.R.D. 679, 689 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); cf. In re LTV See.
Litig., 89 F.R.D. 595, 619-21 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (disclosure to SEC by Special Officer
appointed pursuant to consent decree to investigate corporation waives privilege only
as to the SEC); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated July 13, 1979, 478 F. Supp. 368,
372-73 (E.D. Wis. 1979) (limited release of report to SEC does not waive the
privilege as to third party seeking underlying notes).
134. Diversified Indus. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 611 (8th Cir. 1978) (en bane);
Byrnes v. IDS Realty Trust, 85 F.R.D. 679, 688-89 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
135. The issuance of a subpoena by an administrative agency, as in Diversified,
does not make the disclosure involuntary, because the privilege may be asserted and
the subpoena resisted. See SEC v. First Sec. Bank, 447 F.2d 166, 168 (10th Cir.
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ity. 136 Such a naked disclosure evidences a lack of interest in retaining
the privilege 137 and is thus inconsistent with the rationale for relaxing
the standard in other contexts. 13
Courts employing the liberal approach in SEC situations errone-
ously assume that confidentiality will be preserved when the disclo-
sure is made in a separate nonpublic proceeding.) 39 Given the discre-
tion of the SEC in its investigative practices and procedures, 40
however, the mere fact that the disclosure is made in a nonpublic
proceeding does not provide the basis for an inference of an intent to
preserve confidentiality.' 4 ' The "veil of secrecy" that ordinarily sur-
rounds a private investigation may be lifted by the Commission, and
the information disclosed or made a matter of public record. 4 2 Thus,
although the liberal approach recognizes and sustains the important
public policy to be served by the limited waiver, it fails to condition
relaxation upon evidence of the party's intent to maintain confiden-
tiality. Under such circumstances, the finding of a limited waiver is
unsupportable.
B. The Traditional Approach
In contrast to the policy emphasis of the liberal approach, courts
taking the traditional approach emphasize the confidentiality require-
1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1038 (1972); Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633, 639
(2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 951 (1963).
136. Diversified Indus. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 611 (8th Cir. 1978) (en bane);
Byrnes v. IDS Realty Trust, 85 F.R.D. 679, 685 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
137. See supra notes 101-03 and accompanying text.
138. See supra notes 101-05 and accompanying text.
139. Diversified Indus. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 611 (8th Cir. 1978) (en bane)
("As Diversified disclosed these documents in a separate and nonpublic SEC investi-
gation, we conclude that only a limited waiver of the privilege occurred."); Byrnes v.
IDS Realty Trust, 85 F.R.D. 679, 689 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) ("[T]he Court believes that
voluntary submissions to agencies in separate, private proceedings should be a waiver
only as to that proceeding.").
140. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 21(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(a) (1976); E.
Brodsky, supra note 112, at 14-16; 3 L. Loss, supra note 112. at 1945-56.
141. LaMorte v. Mansfield, 438 F.2d 448, 450 (2d Cir. 1971); see Teachers Ins. &
Annuity Ass'n of Am. v. Shamrock Broadcasting Co., 521 F. Supp. 638, 645
(S.D.N.Y. 1981). SEC regulations insuring privacy in nonpublic investigations, 17
C.F.R. §§ 203.2, 240.0-4 (1981), are for the benefit of the Commission and not for
the party who may disclose privileged information to it. LaMorte v. Mansfield, 438
F.2d 448, 450-51 (2d Cir. 1971); In re Penn Cent. Commercial Paper Litig., 61
F.R.D. 453, 462 n.20 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Case Comment, The Attorney-Client Privi-
lege, the Self-Evaluative Report Privilege, and Diversified Industries, Inc. v. Mere-
dith, 40 Ohio St. L.J. 699, 716-17 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Attorney-Client
Privilege]; 47 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 413, 428-29 (1979).




ment. 143  In In re Penn Central Commercial Paper Litigation,14
involving an attorney who had testified as to privileged information in
a private SEC investigation,145 the court found that the testimony
destroyed confidentiality and thus waived the privilege. 4 , In Per-
mian Corp. v. United States,147 a disclosure of privileged documents
to the SEC was deemed a general waiver when a third party later
sought the documents.148 While acknowledging that the public pol-
icy argument favoring a limited waiver has merit, 40 these courts
reasoned that such an independent policy consideration does not over-
come the requirement of absolute confidentiality.5 0  As stated in In
re Penn Central, "[ilt is hornbook law that the voluntary disclosure or
consent to the disclosure of a communication, otherwise subject to a
claim of privilege, effectively waives the privilege." 151
Permian, however, was not a mere naked disclosure case; there was
an agreement by which confidentiality could be maintained. The SEC
had undertaken an informal investigation in connection with a regis-
tration statement filed by Permian's parent, Occidental. It was clear
that processing of the registration statement would be greatly facili-
tated if the SEC had access to certain privileged documents. Occiden-
tal and the Commission therefore agreed that Occidental would retain
the right to assert a claim of privilege should a third party request that
the SEC disclose any of the documents. When the Department of
Energy subsequently sought the privileged material from the SEC for
its own investigation, Occidental raised a claim of privilege. 52  The
District of Columbia Circuit adhered to the traditional approach,
holding that Occidental's disclosure to the SEC destroyed the privi-
lege. 153
143. Permian Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214, 1219-22 (D.C. Cir. 1981): In
re Penn Cent. Commercial Paper Litig., 61 F.R.D. 453, 463-64 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
144. 61 F.R.D. 453 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
145. Id. at 456.
146. Id. at 463-64; cf. In re Weiss, 596 F.2d 1185 (4th Cir. 1979) (per curiam)
(privilege held waived by testimony given before SEC when testimony later sought
by grand jury).
147. 665 F.2d 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
148. Id. at 1222.
149. Id. at 1221; In re Penn Cent. Commercial Paper Litig., 61 F.R.D. 453, 464
(S.D.N.Y. 1973).
150. Permian Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214, 1221 (D.C. Cir. 1981): In re
Penn Cent. Commercial Paper Litig., 61 F.R.D. 453, 464 (S.D.N.Y. 1973): Attor-
ney-Client Privilege, upra note 141, at 716.
151. 61 F.R.D. at 463.
152. 665 F.2d at 1216-17.
153. Id. at 1222. The court's discussion of the privilege and rejection of the limited
waiver argument was couched in traditional terms: "The privilege depends on the
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Although it reviewed the agreement, the Permian court did not
appreciate its significance in a relaxation of waiver analysis. The
agreement provided Occidental with the opportunity to prevent a
further disclosure by raising a claim of privilege. By demanding such
an opportunity as well as asserting the privilege at the time disclosure
was sought, Occidental took steps to preserve confidentiality. "l By
giving effect to Occidental's intent, the court would have imple-
mented the policy of encouraging cooperation %vith the SEC.
Although the Permian court acknowledged that cooperation was a
"laudable activity"' 5 5 and that the "'SEC's mission" was "impor-
tant," 156 it failed to see how a limited waiver would serve the underly-
ing purpose of the privilege- freedom of communication between
attorney and client. 5 7 The limited waiver is not intended, however,
to enhance the attorney-client relationship, but is intended to further
the policy of cooperation. Without the limited waiver, the client
would simply withhold privileged material from the SEC and the
attorney-client privilege would therefore remain intact. A finding of
limited waiver would also leave the privilege intact but would at the
same time implement the policy of encouraging cooperation with the
SEC. The court also interpreted the problem as one of scope. It saw
no reason to distinguish cooperation with the Department of Energy
from cooperation with the SEC. 158 The court failed to perceive that
without a relaxation of the waiver standard based upon affirmative
conduct to preserve confidentiality, the original cooperation may
never have ensued.
C. A Suggested Approach
The presence or absence of an agreement preserving confidentiality
provides a touchstone for the determination of whether a limited
waiver should be recognized. Although confidentiality in its strictest
sense is compromised by disclosure, the disclosure can be viewed as
essentially confidential in itself if made under conditions that provide
assurance that the SEC will not divulge the privileged information to
third parties. In such a case a limited waiver is proper.
Teachers Insurance & Annuity Association of America v. Shamrock
Broadcasting Co. 59 suggested this moderate approach to the limited
assumption that full and frank communication will be fostered by the assurance of
confidentiality, and the justification for granting the privilege 'ceases when the client
does not appear to have been desirous of secrecy.' " Id. at 1220 (quoting 8 J.
Wigmore, supra note 1, § 2311, at 599).
154. See supra notes 101-05 and accompanying text.
155. Permian Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214, 1221 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
156. Id.
157. Id. at 1220.
158. Id. at 1221.
159. 521 F. Supp. 638 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
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waiver issue. In Teachers, Shamrock sought production of certain
privileged documents that Teachers had previously turned over to the
SEC in response to an agency subpoena. The court held that because
Teachers had not objected to the subpoena on grounds of privilege nor
attempted any other reservation of the privilege, its decision to dis-
close indicated that it had no interest in keeping the documents confi-
dential.160  Furthermore, it was reasoned that public policy should
not "wholly outweigh" the confidentiality requirement.' 0 ' Thus, the
court rejected the liberal approach by refusing to use policy consider-
ations alone to support a finding of limited waiver. By the same token,
however, it also rejected the traditional approach by stating that a
reservation of privilege at the time of disclosure would work to pre-
vent a waiver. 62 Such a reservation
would make it clear that ... the disclosing party has made some
effort to preserve the privacy of the privileged communication,
rather than having engaged in abuse of the privilege by first mak-
ing a knowing decision to waive the rule's protection and then
seeking to retract that decision in connection with subsequent liti-
gation. 63
A stipulation or other agreement between the disclosing party and
the SEC providing for confidential treatment of the material dis-
closed, or a protective order issued in a prior proceeding with respect
to the same disclosure, would satisfy the reservation prerequisite to
limited waiver.' If such an arrangement is made or a protective
order entered, the disclosing party is entitled to rely on it. As an added
measure of protection, the disclosing party should also employ the
formal mechanism provided by SEC regulations for requesting confi-
dential treatment 6 5 pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA). 6 " Although FOIA is primarily a disclosure statute that en-
ables third parties to obtain documents from government agencies,10 7
160. Id. at 641-42.
161. Id. at 645-46.
162. Id. at 646 (dictum).
163. Id. Protective orders and stipulations have been used in investigations by the
SEC on occasion. E.g., Permian Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214, 1216-17
(D.C. Cir. 1981); SEC v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 404 F. Supp. 651, 653 (D.D.C.
1975); see Block & Barton, supra note 12, at 30-31; Herlihy & Levine, Corporate
Crisis: The Overseas Payment Problem, 8 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus. 547, 591-94 (1976).
164. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n of Am. v. Shamrock Broadcasting Co., 521 F.
Supp. 638, 646 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Block & Barton, supra note 12, at 30-31.
165. 17 C.F.R. § 200.83 (1981). Although rule 24b-2, 17 C.F.R. § 240.24b-2
(1981), also provides a means for requesting confidential treatment, it only applies to
information required to be filed under the Act and thus does not pertain to voluntary
disclosure of attorney-client communications. See id.
166. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976).
167. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 291-92 (1979); H.R. Rep. No. 1497,




it contains nine exemptions from mandatory release.les One such
exemption is provided for "trade secrets and commercial or financial
information obtained from a person and privileged or confiden-
tial."169 Under this exemption, when a party discloses privileged or
confidential material to a government agency, it simultaneously re-
quests the agency not to disclose it to third parties. 7 0
It is doubtful, however, whether a FOIA request, when not cou-
pled with an agreement or stipulation, will actually protect confiden-
tiality. The Supreme Court has held that Congress intended FOIA
exemptions to be discretionary with government agencies, not manda-
tory.' 7 ' Agencies are therefore free to disclose material even though it
qualifies for exempt status. Furthermore, under the SEC's FOIA regu-
lations, a determination as to whether exempt status will be granted is
not made until a third party requests the documents.' 2  Thus, at the
time of the disclosure there is no guarantee that the SEC will maintain
confidentiality. A FOIA confidentiality request is therefore not by
itself an adequate reservation. Nevertheless, when a reservation of the
privilege is made, a formal request for confidential treatment under
FOIA should also be made so that the record will be absolutely
clear. 173
CONCLUSION
Whether disclosure of privileged material to the SEC in an informal
investigation will result in a waiver of the attorney-client privilege
remains unresolved. The conflicting emphases placed on the confiden-
tiality requirement on the one hand, and on the policy consideration
168. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1976); see Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 291-92
(1979).
169. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (1976) (emphasis added).
170. H.R. Rep. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 10, reprinted in 1966 U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News 2418, 2427; S. Rep. No. 813, 89th Cong., ist Sess. 9 (1965); Note,
Protection from Government Disclosure-The Reverse-FOIA Suit, 1976 Duke L.J.
330, 331-32.
171. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 285, 293-94 (1979). The Court
recognized that the greater access to governmental information provided by FOIA
"undoubtedly cuts against the privacy concerns of nongovernmental entities, and as a
matter of policy some balancing and accommodation may well be desirable," id. at
293, but held simply that "Congress did not design the FOIA exemptions to be
mandatory bars to disclosure." Id. (footnote omitted).
172. 17 C.F.R. § 200.83(c)(6) (1981).
173. Section 24(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78x(b)
(1976), provides that the SEC may not disclose information in contravention of its
FOIA rules and regulations or when it has determined pursuant to FOIA to treat the
information confidentially. Id. It is arguable that this section would mandate that
the SEC grant confidential treatment under FOIA when the Commission has previ-
ously agreed to maintain confidentiality, even though the agreement was not pursu-
ant to FOIA.
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on the other, have resulted in a good deal of uncertainty. Continued
uncertainty or outright rejection of the limited waiver may substan-
tially affect a decision of whether or not to cooperate with the SEC.
Clear intent to preserve confidentiality is crucial to the determination
of whether to relax the strict standard of waiver. A restrictive agree-
ment with the SEC fully demonstrates such intent. Given the signifi-
cance of encouraging cooperation to the efficacy of the SEC enforce-
ment task, such agreements should be honored.
Martin P. Hicks
